Responsibilities of Employers toward Mentally Disabled Persons under the Americans with Disabilities Act by Mika, Karin & Wimbiscus, Denise
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
1996
Responsibilities of Employers toward Mentally
Disabled Persons under the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Karin Mika
Cleveland State University
Denise Wimbiscus
Progressive Insurance Company
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Disability Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
of Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karin Mika & Denise Wimbiscus, Responsibilities of Employers toward Mentally Disabled Persons under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 11 J.L. & Health 173 (1996-1997)
RESPONSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYERS TOWARD MENTALLY
DISABLED PERSONS UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
KARIN MIKA
1
DENISE WIMBISCUS2
I. MENTAL ILLNESS IN GENERAL .......................... 174
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISABILITY ............ 175
III. WHEN MUST AN EMPLOYER BE ON NOTICE OF A
M ENTAL DISABILITY? ................................ 179
IV. ESSENTIAL JOB FUNCTIONS ............................ 182
V. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION ......................... 184
VI. OTHERWISE QUALIFIED .............................. 185
VII. DIRECT THREAT OF HARM ............................. 188
VIII. THE FUTURE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA:
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE ........................... 189
IX. CONCLUSION ..................................... 193
Proclaimed as "ultimately a civil rights bill, "3 the Americans with Disabilities
Act 4 extended protection of civil rights within the employment sphere for
persons with physical and mental disabilities. 5 At the same time, the legislation
encouraged the integration of persons with disabilities within the workplace.6
While the Americans with Disabilities Act incorporates the language of its
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 7 neither Act contains any statutory
1B.A., Baldwin-Wallace College (1986); J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(1989). Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Research & Advocacy at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law.
2 B.A., University of Notre Dame (1985); J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(1995). Litigation Manager of United Financial Casualty Company of Progressive
Insurance Company.
3 H.R. Rep. No. 485(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1990).
442 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990)(hereinafter the Act or ADA).
5 William Stein, A New Bill of Rights for Millions: the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 46 ARB. J. 6, 6 (1991).
6 H.R. Rep. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1990).
729 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1985). The Federal Rehabilitation Act prohibits employment
discrimination against disabled individuals by all employers receiving federal funds.
In comparison, the ADA applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees
whether or not they receive federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A)(1990).
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specifics that address the difficulties of dealing with mental illness in the
workplace. Because the Americans with Disabilities Act is vague with respect
to accommodating mental illness and because mental illness itself is often part
of uncertain science, the rights and responsibilities of employers dealing with
alleged or perceived mental illness are also uncertain. One of the areas that is
most problematic for an employer when making promotion and retention
decisions is making promotion and retention decisions that comport with their
legal obligations. Employers raise legitimate concerns about what are their
rights in making employment decisions, especially in light of their duty under
the Americans with Disabilities Act as well as their interest in maintaining a
profitable, efficient business.
This article will discuss the standards of the ADA with respect to
accommodating mental illness in the workplace. It will argue the ADA
definitions are not precise enough in apprising employers of what are their
obligations regarding mentally ill persons in the workplace. It will additionally
make suggestions for revising the statute and regulations to achieve this goal.
In reaching its conclusion, this article will discuss popular conceptions about
mental illness, and the current statutory framework of the ADA.
Representative case law will be considered within the context of these topics.
The article will ultimately suggest that fairness to both employers and
employees can only be achieved by clearer definitions within the statute and
an overt acknowledgment that mental disabilities are not necessarily
synonymous with physical disabilities.
I. MENTAL ILLNESS.IN GENERAL
The medical definition of "mental illness," in many respects, differs from the
popular understanding of the term. 8 Popular culture often associates mentally
ill as synonymous with insanity "with the result" being a crazed and
uncontrolled behavior.9 This picture may conjure images of straitjackets, forced
sedation electroshock therapy.10 Popular culture does not always associate
mental illness with depression or alcoholism-legitimate mental health
disorders that do not always substantially affect day-to-day functioning, and,
in fact, are quite prevalent in our society.11
8 See John Lagos, et. al., Fear of the Mentally Ill: Empirical Support for the Common Man's
Response, 134 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 1134, 1134 n.1 (1977).
9See Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental Health Treatment
in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 349-51 (1996).
10Hollywood often creates and perpetuates myths and stereotypes about mental
illness. See Otto F. Wahl, Media Madness: Public Images of Mental Illness, VANCOUVER SUN,
Apr. 20, 1996, at D14.
11
"The most common psychiatric disorders [are] major depression and alcohol
dependence." See John D. Thompson, Psychiatric Disorders, Workplace Violence and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 19 HAMuINE L. REV. 25,26 (1995).
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Mental health professionals themselves disagree as to whether personality
disorders, alcohol abuse, and substance abuse are properly characterized as
mental illness or personality flaws.12 There is also a debate as to whether
gender-related conditions such as menopause and premenstrual syndrome are
substantially "life-impairing" such that they too might require legal
accommodation as mental illnesses under the federal statute.13 In addition,
there are some organic disorders, such as mental retardation and Alzheimer's
disease, that are both physical and mental disabilities. 14
Mental health professionals as a whole struggle with where drawing the line
between normal and abnormal behavior.15 The conglomerate of mental health
professionals share many common methods of diagnosing "mentally ill"
patients, but often disagree on ultimate assessments and modes of
treatments. 16 The tool most widely used by mental health professionals is the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), produced by the
American Psychiatric Association as an attempt at uniform diagnosis within
the profession. 17 Now in its fourth revision, the DSM-IV, like its three
predecessors, has been criticized because of its complexity and because it is
more of an encyclopedia of classification rather than a diagnostic tool. 18 The
current DSM validates the reality that there are many uncertain aspects of
behavioral study.
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF MENTAL DISABILrrY
One of the difficulties of eliminating employment discrimination against
persons with mental disabilities is recognizing what is a mental disability
requiring accommodation under federal law. Many mental disabilities are not
12Menachem Krakowski, et al., Psychopathology and Violence: A Review of Literature,
27 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHOL. 131 (1986).
13See Lee Solomon, Colloquium: Gender, Law, and Health Care: Premenstrual Syndrome:
The Debate Surrounding Criminal Defense, 54 MD. L. REv. 571 (1995)(commenting on the
addition of premenstrual dysphoric disorder to the list of depressive disorders in the
DSM-IV).
14 See, e.g., Anne DesNoyers Hurley, Identifying Psychiatric Disorders in Persons with
Mental Retardation: A Model Illustrated by Depression in Down Syndrome, 62 J. REHAB. 27
(1996).
15Theodore Lidz, et al., Letters to the Editor, 151 AM J. PSYCHIATRY 458-59 (1994).
16There are various professions regarded as being within the realm of"mental health
professionals." The DSM-IV lists, among others, psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers, occupational and rehabilitation therapists, and counselors. AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
xv (4th ed. 1994).
171d.; see also Aya V. Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims Under
California's Workers' Compensation System, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1327, 1346-47 (1994).
18Herb Kutchins & Stuart A. Kirk, DSM-IV: Does Bigger Mean Better? HARv. MENTAL
HEALTH LETTER, May 1, 1995.
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visible or readily apparent to most observers and still may warrant protection
under the ADA if properly diagnosed;19 however, definitions of some types of
mental disabilities under the ADA are not precise enough to make clear the
persons who are intended to benefit from the Act's protection. The statute
grants protection to those having a "mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual."20 The Code
of Federal Regulations supplements this definition by adding, "any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 21 There is no
comprehensive list as to what emotional or mental illnesses were contemplated
by the legislature, and recognized "legal" mental disabilities are established on
a case-by-case basis.22
Under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, individuals may meet the
definition of "handicapped" or "disabled" in three different ways.23 The first is
that the person must have an actual physical or mental impairment that
"substantially limits one or more major life activities."24 The second is that the
person has a "record" of such an impairment;25 for instance, the person has been
previously hospitalized for the disorder.26 The third way is to be regarded "as
having such an impairment"27-sometimes described as "having been treat-
ed as handicapped," or discriminated against because of "unsubstantiated
19 See, e.g., Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
2042 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1995).
2129 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (1996).
22 Among the illnesses recognized under the Rehabilitation Act are depression,
manic-depression, depressive neurosis, paranoid schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and bi-polar disorder. Thompson, supra note 11, at fns. 78, 80, 82 (citing
respectively Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. Tenn. 1991);
Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. Mo. 1985); Doe v. Region 13 Mental
Health-Mental Retardation Comm., 704 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. Miss. 1983); Franklin v.
United States Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S. D. Ohio 1988); Schmidt v. Bell, 1 Am.
Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 491 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134 (D. Md.
1988).
23 The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, predecessor to the ADA, was intended by Congress
to make the federal government into a "model employer of handicapped individuals"
by eliminating employment discrimination against persons with physical and mental
disabilities. See Whitlock v. Donovan, 598 F. Supp. 126 (D.D.C. 1984). The Congressional
debate prior to the enactment of the ADA reflect Congress's consideration and approval
of interpretive case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act. H.R. Rep. No. 485(11),
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 50-54 (1991).
2429 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (West 1995).
251d.
26 See, e.g., Pridemore v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 625 F. Supp. 1171 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
271d.
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concerns."28 Those meeting one of the definitions must be qualified for the job
which they "hold or desire."29 Any accommodation for the person must be
"reasonable" for the employer to make.30 In this definitional section, the Act
makes no distinction between physical and mental impairments.
Congress articulated a desire for the ADA to provide better standards for
application than did the Rehabilitation Act.3 1 Section 12101(b)(2) of the ADA
expressly states that the purpose of the legislation is to develop "clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards" for preventing employment discrimination
with respect to those disabilities articulated. To accomplish this purpose,
Congress instructed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to formulate final instructive regulations within one year of the
implementation of the Act.32 The interpretative guidelines for the portions of
the statute dealing with Mental Disabilities is included in the Code of Federal
Regulations as an appendix to Section 1630. The EEOC has also issued
"technical assistance manuals" for Parts I, II, and III of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 33
The "Interpretive Guidance" of the EEOC mirrors the Rehabilitation Act
regulations. Both specify that "mental impairment" is "any mental or
psychological disorder."34 However, under the interpretive guidelines, a
distinction is made between behaviors that are merely the result of undesirable
personality traits as opposed to behaviors that are symptoms of a mental or
psychological disorder.35 The guidelines and the corresponding federal
regulations specifically exclude from their definitions persons with disorders
stemming from current illegal drug use.36
Once the existence of a protected "impairment" is established, the individual
must demonstrate that he or she is "otherwise qualified" for the job.37
Qualification is measured by whether the person has the appropriate
educationalbackground, skills, and experience. 38 If so, the person must be able
28 See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Pushkin v.
Regents of University of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1987).
2942 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (West 1995).
3042 U.S.C. § 12111(a) (West 1995).
31 See, e.g., A & P ADA Comm. Print (28C) 1913-14 (1990).
32See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1 (1996).
33Thompson, supra note 11, at n. 59.
34 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
351d.
3629 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. 1630.3(a)-(c) (1996).
3729 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)(m) (1996).
381d.
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to perform "essential job functions,"39 as opposed to marginal functions, with
or without reasonable accommodation provided by the employer.40 A qualified
person with a disability must request an accommodation from the employer
who then has the option to choose the mechanism for the accommodation from
among any available "reasonable" alternatives. 41 The ADA does not allow
pre-employment inquiries into medical history.42
Daley v. Koch43 is the leading case dealing with the distinction between
general character or behavioral traits that are undesirable as distinguished
from behavior symptomatic of an abnormal mental condition. In Daley, the
employee applied for a position as a police officer. The application process
required the employee to submit to psychological testing.44 The testing
revealed that the employee exhibited "poor judgment, irresponsible behavior
and poor impulse control."45 As a result of the testing, he was denied the
position. The employee then filed a discrimination claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, charging that he was denied the position because of his
mental disability.46 The court refused to recognize the claim, holding that
commonplace personality traits do not rise to the level of impairment intended
by Congress to be protected. No further evidence was presented by the
plaintiff-employee to show that he had been diagnosed with mental illness or
a mental disorder. The court did not consider a personality shortcoming to fall
within the protections of the statute.47
In another case decided under the Rehabilitation Act, the employee also
failed to meet the threshold requirement of possessing a legally recognized
disability. Butler v Department of Navy48 involved a National Naval Medical
Center warehouse worker who had a very poor attendance record during his
time on the job. When he did report to work, he failed to follow orders and took
unauthorized breaks. At one point, he physically threatened his supervisor
3929 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1)-(3) (1996).
4029 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1996).
41 See Baxter v. Wisconsin Dep't. of Natural Resources, 477 N.W.2d 648 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991) (procuring a "job coach" for a depressed person held not mandatory).
4242 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (West 1995); see also H.R. Rep. No. 485(1I) 101st Cong., 2d Sess.,
42-43 (1990). This has immense consequences in the realm of employment decisions
dealing with potential mental disabilities. Since employers dealing with persons with
disabilities will not be able to readily observe the disability, as a practical matter, the
employee would have to disclose the condition to the employer in order to be
accommodated.
43892 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1989).
441d. at 213.
45 Id. at 214.
461d.
47892 F.2d at 215-16.
48595 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Md. 1984).
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stating that "he didn't want to hear anything from [him]," believing his
supervisor should not "dictate" to him.49 The plaintiff was terminated by the
employer within one year of his hire date. In response to his firing, the
employee charged the Navy with failure to make reasonable accommodation
for his "handicap."50 In finding against the plaintiff, the court stated that an
employee is not excused for misconduct or unsatisfactory performance that
does not relate to a legally-recognized "handicap."51
III. WHEN MusT AN EMPLOYER BE ON NOTICE OF A MENTAL DISABILTY?
Although the Code of Federal Regulations suggests that it is the burden of
the person seeking "accommodation" to let the employer know of a disability,52
cases involving an alleged mental disability generally come about after the
employee has been discharged without any accommodation having been
sought.53 In these situations, the employee usually asserts that he/she had a
mental disability that was not diagnosed during employment, but was
nonetheless responsible for the behavior that resulted in discharge. Despite no
accommodation being sought while employed, these plaintiffs bring causes of
action under the ADA maintaining that the termination was discrimination
based on disability.54
These situations illustrate the difficulties of understanding what are the
obligations of employers under the statute, especially where mental illness is
concerned. In some respects it would be unfair to hold a person responsible for
his/her actions when there is a legitimate mental illness; however, it is equally
unfair to expect that an employer should reasonably accommodate an
employee before being apprised of the problem. This is especially true since an
employer is statutorily proscribed from asking about a disability that has not
been disclosed.55
Another complexity for employers is interpreting the portion of the Act
stating that disabled could mean "regarded as having such an impairment."56
Although this definition in the statute was originally intended to protect those
49 Id. at 1066.
50Id. at 1067.
51 d.
52See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (a) (1996): "It is unlawful for a covered entity not to make
reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified applicant." Id.
53 See, e.g., Office of Senate Sergeant at Arms v. Office of Senate Fair Employment
Practices, 95 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Scarbrough v. Runyon, 92 F.3d 1187 (7th Cir.
1996); Beck v. University of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996).
54Id.
5542 U.S.C. § 12112 (d)(1) (West 1995).
5642 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(c) (West 1995).
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whose disability did not limit functioning,57 this definition has been used by
employees asserting that an employer treated the employee as mentally ill. This
has presumably occurred by disciplining or discharging the employee when
that employee was not performing his or her job adequately.58 In other
instances, the employee has asserted that the employer "should have known"
that problem behavior was the result of a legitimate mental illness.59 These
cases have raised a question as to whether the employer is ever responsible for
recognizing and accommodating behaviors that may be indicative of mental
illness, or for being responsible when erratic behavior is noticed. There is also
a conceivable issue as to whether an employer may actually be subjecting itself
to a discrimination suit under the ADA when a supervisor does not care for a
subordinate's personality.60
For the most part, courts will not impose an obligation on an employer to
accommodate an employee perceived to be mentally ill.61 For instance, in
Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co.,62 the court held that an employee who had "poor
behavioral traits and performance problems" was not disabled under ADA
definitions. In this case, the plaintiff was not diagnosed with a mental problem,
nor did she claim a mental impairment. Rather, she could not get along with
any of her co-workers and had a history of a negative attitude towards her
work.63 After discharge, she sought protection under the ADA because she
claimed her employer "perceived a mental impairment" leading to her
termination-that is, she claimed she had been "treated" as impaired and
consequently discriminated against by virtue her termination. In finding for
the defendant, the court determined that a perceived, undiagnosed impairment
did not fall within the intended provisions coverage of the Act and the
employer was not obligated under federal law to maintain her employment.64
The EEOC's interpretive guidelines state that employers are only obligated
to attempt reasonable accommodation for those employees known to be
disabled, but does not specify whether "known" means medically validated.
The guidelines state that, in general, it is the obligation of the disabled
employee to notify the employer that an accommodation is needed. 65 It is not
clear, however, whether an employer is free to inquire of an employee who
57 A&P ADA Comm. Print (28A) 121 (1990).
58 See, e.g., Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
59See, e.g., Fenton v. Pritchard Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1996).
60 See Thompson, supra note 11, at 55.
61 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Kroger Co., 863 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1994); Nuccio v. Frank,
No. 91-3702 (E.D. La. June 17,1992).
62920 F. Supp. 1566, 1580 (N.D. Ala. 1996).
631d. at 1573-78.
64Id. at 1580-81.
6529 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (1996).
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displays symptoms of mental illness as to whether an accommodation is needed.
The statement in the EEOC guidelines is phrased in a manner which suggests
that only those with known disabilities may be approached by the employer
with a suggestion of accommodation. The guidelines also leave open the
possibility that an undiagnosed disability may be "known" because it is
"obvious.' 66 While the regulations permit employers to require employees to
submit to medical examinations when there is a need to determine whether an
employee who is on-the-job is still able to perform the essential functions of the
job,67 it is unclear how this plays out when a mental disability is suspected.
The 1995 case of, Stola v. Joint Indus. Bd.,68 is indicative of one's court's point
of view of employer's responsibility. In Stola, the plaintiff-employee was an
apprentice electrician who engaged in threatening and menacing behavior,
necessitating his removal from the workplace by security personnel. 69 His
employer terminated him as a result of this behavior. The employee claimed
ADA protection because his behavior was a product of a "general anxiety"
disorder, which was not diagnosed until after he was terminated. The court
ruled in favor of the employer, primarily because there had been no notice of
the disability. The plaintiff, in turn, asserted that he was unaware of his own
condition and therefore could not notify the employer of it, nor seek reasonable
accommodation. 70 The employee also claimed that the employer was on notice
of the mental disability by virtue of the employee's conduct.71 The court did
not accept this argument, stating that the employer is obliged to accommodate
only those disabilities that are obvious or called to its attention by the
employee. The court determined the employer is not obliged at its peril to
determine whether the behavior was the product of a disability.72 Similarly in
Fenton v. Pritchard,73 the plaintiff claimed he should have been protected from
dismissal because his employer "knew" he was "mentally impaired." In this
case, the plaintiff harassed a female co-worker because he wanted to have a
relationship with her. When he was spurned, he followed her and sent her
threatening notes.74 The female complained to her supervisors and the plaintiff
was warned numerous times that his advances were affecting the workplace.
After an encounter in which the plaintiff slapped the woman outside of her
66 1d.
6729 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(c) (1996).
68889 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
691d. at 134-35.
701d.
71Id. at 135.
72889 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
73926 F. Supp. 1437 (D. Kan. 1996).
74 Id. at 1441-42.
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apartment, the plaintiff was fired. 75 In finding no ADA protection, the court
commented that even though the defendants believed the plaintiff could be
violent, that did not translate into a belief that the plaintiff was disabled. The
court stated that the plaintiff "would have this court ignore objectionable
behavior and instead impute to [plaintiff] this contrived theory of mental
disability."76
Decisions protecting the employee are rare, however, the plaintiff in Collins
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan,77 prevailed on a theory of discrimination
despite not seeking an accommodation for a disability. In Collins, the plaintiff
took medical leave for stress and began psychiatric treatment for major
depression/ adjustment disorder. During her psychotherapy, the employee
made the following statements about her supervisor: "She is living on
borrowed time and she doesn't know it"; "I have killed her a thousand times in
my mind."78 Based on the report of these statements, the employee was
terminated after she was released to return to work by the treating psychiatrist.
In finding for the employee, the court stated that the statements were not made
in the workplace and were products of her psychiatric disability. Thus, the
statements were not workplace misconduct and not a proper basis for lawful
termination.79 As such, the court found, "terminating her on the basis of the
statements was equivalent to terminating her because of her disability."80 The
employee was found entitled to ADA protection.
IV. ESSENTIAL JoB FUNCTIONS
If an individual has a legitimate disability and that disability creates a barrier
to employment opportunities, the ADA requires employers to consider
whether reasonable accommodation could remove the barrier.81 However,
while the ADA focuses on removing barriers, it does not relieve a disabled
employee from the obligation of performing "essential job functions" as
opposed to marginal job functions.82 The EEOC Appendix and the Technical
Assistance Manual provide examples of what are to be considered essential job
functions; however, both make clear that an essential job function is defined by
the particular job and that an "essential" function may change from job to job.83
751d.
761d. at 1445.
77916 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
781d. at 640.
791d. at 643.
8 Id.
8129 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1996).
8229 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1996).
8329 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996); EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 100,120,
100,113-15 (1994).
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The Appendix defines essential functions as "those functions that the
individual who holds the position must be able to perform unaided or with the
assistance of a reasonable accommodation. "84 It discusses three factors that are
generally considered.85 The first is whether the position exists to fulfill a
particular function. 86 The second is whether there are other employees to
whom the function can be distributed and still have the function be
accomplished. 87 The third factor is the degree of expertise or skill required to
perform the function. 88 The employer's judgment as to what is essential to
performance of the job is relevant to the inquiry, but is not conclusive.89 Also,
the business judgment of the employer will be given deference with regard to
production standards.90 In the end, the EEOC states that the determination of
essential job functions is a factual determination that must be made on a
case-by-case basis.91 Courts have also made various determinations as to what
should be considered "implicitly essential" job functions. Since these are neither
articulated by statute or regulation, "implicitly essential" job functions are
somewhat fluid and their existence may depend on the particular employment
situation. Some implicitly essential functions are that employees must be
amenable to supervision and must have the ability to follow the orders of
supervisors. 92 Employees must also be able to control behavior on the job, and
to refrain from engaging in physical violence while at work.9 3 The ability to
understand ordinary pressures of the job has been found "implicitly
essential.' 94 In addition, it has been held that "regular and predictable"
attendance is an implicit job requirement.95
8429 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
85 d. The three factors are explications of 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(n)(i)-(iii) (1996).
8629 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(i) (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
8729 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(ii) (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
8829 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(iii) (1996); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
89 See EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 100,120, 100,114 (1992): "An employer's
judgment as to which functions are essential is important evidence. However, the
legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress did not intend that this should
be the only evidence, or that it should be the prevailing evidence. Rather, the employer's
judgment is a factor to be considered along with other relevant evidence." Id.
901d.
9129 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
92 See, e.g., Mancini v. General Elec. Co., 820 F. Supp. 141 (D. Vt. 1993); see also Adams
v. Alderson, 723 F. Supp. 1531 (D.D.C. 1989).
93 Palmer v. Circuit Court of Cook County, 905 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Inl. 1995);
Mazzarella v. United States Postal Serv., 849 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994).
94 Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 942 F.2d 437 (6th Cir. 1991).
95Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994); Car v. Reno, 23 F.3d
525 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Va. 1991).
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V. REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION
The EEOC Appendix defines an accommodation to be any change in the
work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an
individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities. 96
Beyond that, the EEOC Appendix discusses possible accommodation as a
reallocation of non-essential job functions, as well as transferring employees to
other jobs within the organization.9 7 The EEOC Appendix states that
transferring may not be used to limit and segregate disabled workers from
others, and also that employers need only consider transferring to vacant
positions as opposed to creating positions. 98 There is no discussion of or
requirement to displace other employees in order to accommodate the disabled
employee.
The Code of Federal Regulations also suggests possible accommodations
such as job restructuring, re-assignment to vacant positions, and modified
work schedules, but does not detail any specific mandatory
accommodations.9 9 In essence, the only requirements are that the employer
and the employee engage in an informal, interactive process of determining
the appropriate accommodation for the particular individual.100 The lack of
precision is not helpful to employers or employees, but is most likely the result
of an attempt to cover many individualized circumstances and to include as
many individuals as possible.101
There are various cases that have discussed what would not be a reasonable
accommodation. In Adams v. Alderson,102 the court held that even if disruptive
conduct could be traced to a compulsive personality disorder, federal law did
not require that the plaintiff be reasonably accommodated by being separated
from the supervisor with whom he had a personality conflict. This was also the
case in Mazzarella v. United States Postal System,103 in which the court stated, "It
is not reasonable, however to expect the [employer] to juggle personnel so as
to entirely remove the possibility that a supervisor may offend a particular
employee." The court in Hogarth v. Thornburgh,104 found that it was not
reasonable to accommodate an FBI employee by having his medical treatment
monitored, or temporarily restricting his access to confidential documents.
9629 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
97 d.
98 d.
9929 C.F.R. §1630.2(o) (1996).
10029 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (1996).
101 See EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 100,120, 100,112 (1992).
102723 F. Supp. 1531 (D.D.C. 1989).
103849 F. Supp. 89, 96 (D. Mass. 1994).
104833 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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Reiterating the reasoning of School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline,105 the Hogarth
court determined that reasonable accommodations did not include finding
another job for a person who could no longer perform his or her own job.106
VI. OTHERWISE QUALIFIED
Although "otherwise qualified" is a prima facie showing prior to
demonstrating an essential job function can be performed with reasonable
accommodation, the term is problematic when assessing how mental illness
affects job qualification after hire. When a mental condition has been
diagnosed, is it possible that a worker can engage in behavior that makes him
no longer be qualified for the job? The courts have answered this question
inconsistently. In some cases, an act of violence or possession of a weapon is
sufficient to negate qualification and justify termination without violating
ADA standards. 107 In other cases, the employer may be required to retain the
employee because the unacceptable behavior is a symptom of a legitimate
mental illness. 108
For example, in Matzo v. Postmaster General,109 the plaintiff-employee was a
stenographer who had been employed with the United States Postal
Headquarters for ten years. During the last three years on the job, her job
performance deteriorated as the result of intermittent episodes of "erratic,
disruptive, and insubordinate" behavior.110 The employee subsequently
notified her employer that she had been diagnosed with manic-depressive
illness. The employee remained on the job, but with no improvement in
behavior. She was issued a letter of warning, after which she left the office
without permission and did not return. Several weeks later, the employee did
not respond to a notice to report for a fitness-for-duty exam and she was
subsequently terminated. The employee claimed the termination was
predicated on the fact that she was diagnosed as a manic-depressive. 1 "1 In
seeking status as an "otherwise qualified person," the employee claimed that
her disability was controllable by medication and was in remission. The court
105480 U.S. 273 (1987).
106833 F. Supp. at 1088.
107See Franklin v. United States Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988)(lawful
termination for possession of a weapon despite diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia),
but cf. Hindman v. GTE Data Serv., Inc., No. 93-1046-CIV-T-17C, 1994 WL 371396 (M.D.
Fla. June 24, 1994)(unlawful termination for possession of a weapon with diagnosis of
chemical imbalance).
10 8Hindmn, 1994 WL 371396.
109685 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1987).
1101d. at 261.
11lId. at 263.
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disagreed stating that her inability to report to work made her unqualified for
a position that required employees to show up for work.112
Similarly, in Franklin v. United States Postal Service, the employee had a record
of an "unfavorable and belligerent attitude towards her co-workers and
towards the public."113 Off the job, she had been arrested for fraud, assault, and
disorderly conduct. Her illness was diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenia.
After appearing with a concealed weapon at the state governor's office, she
was terminated from her job. The employee claimed discrimination based on
the fact that her behavior was a symptom of her mental illness and as such
could not be a legal basis for termination.11 4 In response, the court decided that
since there was evidence that the employee could control her symptoms by
medication and at times chose not to medicate herself, the absenteeism was not
a symptom of her illness. 115 The court also reasoned that a person with a history
of anti-social behavior whose condition of paranoid schizophrenia is not
controllable by medication (or otherwise) is a danger to the public and to
co-workers. Consequently, that person is not an "otherwise qualified"
individual.116
More recently, in Greenberg v. New York State,117 an applicant for the position
of Corrections Officer was denied employment because the pre-employment
psychological exam revealed that he was unable to perform efficiently under
stress. He also lacked the ability to make sound safety and security decisions
'in emergency circumstances. The plaintiff then brought suit under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. In finding against the plaintiff, the court
determined that since the plaintiff did not have a diagnosed mental disorder,
but merely did not have the personality attributes required for the particular
job, he did not warrant protection under the ADA.118
Hogarth v. Thornburgh,119 represents the most favorable analysis finding an
employee "otherwise qualified," despite ultimately determining that no
reasonable accommodation could be made. In Hogarth, the plaintiff was a clerk
1121d. The Matzo court sidestepped consideration of the fact that the employee's
inability to work, or any of her other behavior, was symptomatic of her disability. The
disruptive behavior was not a key fact in the determination. However, the court could
have characterized the disruptive behavior as an example of violation of work rules,
which would justify termination. On the other hand, these behaviors could be
symptomatic of a manic-depressive illness which arguably protected behavior and
requires accommodation.
113687 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
1141d.
115Id.
1161d.
117919 F. Supp. 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
1181d. at 643.
119833 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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with the FBI, who was diagnosed with manic-type bi-polar disorder. His
irregular behavior included submitting a fraudulent doctor's excuse for a back
injury and having homosexual relations at work. He was terminated based on
this behavior. The plaintiff presented medical testimony which linked the acts
for which he was terminated to the diagnosed mental disorder.120 The FBI
defended the termination by stating that the lack of reliability and stability
exhibited by the employee justified disqualification for the security clearance
required for all FBI employees.121 The court engaged in an extensive analysis
of the "otherwise qualified" definition. 122 The court pointed out that if a
disability manifests itself in certain behavior which is used as a reason for
discharge, then there is actionable discrimination. 123 To illustrate this point, the
court analogized the situation to one in which an individual with a limp is fired
for the "thumping sound" made when he walks, or the employee with epilepsy
who is fired for his seizures. 124 Otherwise, the court explained, employers
would be able to claim lack of awareness of the link between the disability and
its manifestations. 125
In a similar case, the court of Hindman v. GTE Data Services, Inc.,126 considered
an employee diagnosed with a "chemical imbalance" which required
hospitalization. Within several days, the employee returned to work carrying
a concealed weapon in violation of a work rule.127 The employer cited this
work-rule infraction as just cause for termination. In response, the employee
alleged discrimination due to a mental handicap, explaining that the poor
judgment displayed in choosing to carry the concealed weapon was merely a
symptom of the chemical imbalance and not evidence of deficient character. A
right to continued employment was claimed under the ADA and granted
pending a mental health evaluation to determine whether the behavior could
be attributed to the illness, thus making the employee "otherwise qualified" to
perform his job.
1201d. at 1082.
121id.
1221d. at 1084.
123833 F. Supp. at 1085.
124Id.
125Id. According to the court in Hogarth, all employees at times fail to perform their
job functions. For a person with a disability, two factors determine whether the person
is qualified for a position despite a disability. One issue to consider is the consequences
of a failure to perform. The other issue is the likelihood that the failure is caused by the
disabling condition. With this reasoning, the court opened up the possibility that certain
behaviors are protected and will continue to be protected until the cause of a behavior
can be determined. If the behaviors are caused by mental illness, the employee would
be protected and may be kept on the job with accommodation.
126 No. 93-1046, Civ-T-17C (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1994).
1271d. at *'2.
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VII. DIRECT THREAT OF HARM
According to the ADA and corresponding regulations, employers are not
mandated to keep employees in the workplace who pose a direct threat of harm
to the health or safety of an individual or others, if no accommodation can
mitigate the risk.128 To identify the potential for harm, an assessment of the
individual's present ability to safely perform the essential functions of the job
must be "based on reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge .. "129 The risk posed by allowing the individual into the
workplace must be significant and contain a high probability of substantial
harm.130 The EEOC Appendix directs that the threat of harm must be based on
"individualized, objective evidence.' 131 Most of the Congressional and EEOC
discussion about "threat of harm" relates to employees with communicable
diseases, such as HIV.132 There is no discussion relative to the threat of harm
posed by mentally ill employees who may be prone to violence.
The majority of the cases which involve mentally-disabled employees who
engage in workplace violence have been resolved by summary judgment in
favor of the employers, because the employees have failed to make out a prima
facie case of discrimination. The stumbling block for most plaintiffs has been
the inability to prove either that the employee is disabled within the meaning
of the statute, or that the employee is "otherwise qualified" and able to perform
the essential job functions without accommodation or with some reasonable
accommodation provided by the employer.1 33 Because of the failure to state a
viable cause of action, the question of whether the employer has a defense of
the "direct threat of harm" has rarely been considered in workplace violence or
disruption situations. 134 A case that did consider "direct threat of harm," Kohnke
v. Delta Airlines,135 decided in 1996, determined that discharge for a direct threat
of harm applies only when others are threatened, not just when a person is
self-destructive. 136 This case has had no bearing on the development of law
12842 U.S.C. § 12113; see also 29 C.F.R. §1630.2 (r); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
12929 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1996).
130Id.
13129 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (1996).
132 H.R. Rep. No. 485(111), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1990).
133See supra notes 62-118 and accompanying text.
134 Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctr., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1996) considered
direct threat of harm in relation to a hearing impaired bus driver's potential to "harm"
children by not hearing choking at the back of the bus.
135932 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. 111. 1996).
136The manner in which the case law has developed makes the "direct threat" aspect
practically irrelevant. It would seem that the only instance in which this aspect of the
regulations would make an impact is when an applicant for a job reveals that he has
been diagnosed with a mental disorder. In this case, an employer could not refuse to
hire the applicant onthebasis of generalized fears thatpersons withthat mental disorder
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concerning what evidence demonstrates a direct threat of harm to others,
although one could speculate that threatening people and carrying a weapon
at work would suffice to constitute a direct threat of harm.
The "direct threat" aspect of the statute represents its own incongruities with
what are the intentions of the ADA. While the statute allows for a dismissal to
be made when there is a direct threat of harm, the statute forbids direct inquiry
as to an employee's mental condition and does not address the statute's
application when the direct threat of harm be a manifestation of a legitimately
diagnosed mental illness. This puts the employer in the intriguing position of
being in compliance with the law to dismiss a potentially violent person (under
the rationale the employee is not qualified) than it would be to encourage
solving a problem with suggesting psychological or psychiatric help.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF MENTAL DISABILITIES UNDER THE ADA:
SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
Overall, the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, and the EEOC's interpretative
guidelines provide employers with few specifics outlining legal obligations to
mentally-disabled persons. Although it is abundantly clear that employers win
most actions brought under the ADA, the analysis used by courts to reach these
decisions is not uniform. Some courts have focused on the lack of notice to
employers. Other courts have found disruptive behavior equal to an inability
to perform an essential or implicitly essential job function. Other courts have
found those with certain personality quirks automatically unqualified under
the statututory definitions, while other courts have ultimately determined that
engaging in certain on-the-job behaviors will make an individual unqualified.
Courts have made these decisions even when the behavior resulting in
termination was the product of a legitimate mental illness. Based on these
decisions, even employers familiar with case law do not know exactly what
situations are covered under the Act.
One can assume there is a certain wisdom in the vagueness in the statute.
The EEOC Tecnical Assistance Manual states, "Neither the statute nor EEOC
regulations list all diseases or conditions that make up 'physical or mental
impairments,' because it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive list,
given the variety of possible impairments. ' 137 If the statute specifically
articulated those mental illnesses protected, it would invariably leave out
others that should legitimately be included. However, as knowledge of
behaviors increases, the statute should be adapted to reflect increases in
knowledge. The statute should not be a license to discriminate by virtue of too
are prone to violence. Instead, the action would have to be predicated on particularized
objective evidence of prior acts of violence or misconduct, or a medical opinion which
states that the applicant is likely to engage in imminent violence. For a discussion of
these issues, see Mary E. Sharp, The Hidden Disability that Finds Protection under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Employing the Mentally Impaired, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 899
(1996).
137EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 100,120, 100,108 (1992).
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much specificity, but the Act should do more in order to clearly apprise
employers of their obligations while apprising employees of their rights.
Clarity and specificity within the law would also hinder abuse by those who
were not intended to be protected.
Caselaw demonstrates that a suit for discrimination after termination is
likely to be unsuccessful absent a mental health professional's diagnosis. Given
this reality, the statute should be amended to include a provision stating that
those seeking accommodation for mental disability (and subsequently
bringing action for lack of accommodation) must submit a documented mental
health evaluation to their employer. The mental health evaluation should
include what the professional would believe to be a reasonable accommodation
and an approximate time frame (even if indefinite) for how long the reasonable
accommodation would have to be made. Requiring documentation under the
statute would allow courts to dismiss suits in which the discharged employee
asserts an undiagnosed ailment and then attempts medical validation after
dismissal. It would also eliminate the need for employers to guess what legally
should be done, with employees exhibiting anti-social behavior. Without
medical validation presented by the employee to the employer, the employer
would be free to assess the anti-social employee in the context of other
anti-social employees without the fear of making a decision that would violate
the Act.
In addition, the statute should be amended to absolve an employer from
liability for asking about a disability, or should more clearly apprise the
employer when it is obligated to inquire whether an individual requires an
accommodation. Under current law, it is not clear whether an employer may
ask about a specific disability unless that disability is "obvious.'138 Given that
mental disabilities are rarely obvious,139 the statute should also be amended to
preclude employers from liability for discharging an employee who does not
have an illness diagnosed until after termination. If employers are prevented
from asking overt questions, they should be explicitly absolved from having
the responsibility for detecting mental illness by way of behavior, and
suggesting that an employee seek a diagnosis.
While these revisions might remedy situations in which employees allege
wrongful termination because no reasonable accommodation was made, these
revisions will not remedy complications associated with employees alleging
discrimination because of a "record of impairment" or because of being
"regarded as impaired." The original purpose of these descriptions was to
ensure that recuperated individuals or those functioning well with a legitimate
handicap would not be discriminated against on the basis of misperception. 140
138 Thompson, supra note 11, at 54.
139 Id.
140 See Arline, 480 U.S. at 283: "By amending the definition of "handicapped
individual" to include not only those who are actually physically impaired but also those
who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major
life activiity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated myths and fears about
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While these descriptions might originally have contemplated physical
disabilities, for instance, the misperception that a person with a bad scar would
not be accepted by the general public as a store clerk,141 it is conceivable that
misperceptions about mental illness might result in the same type of prejudice.
A recovered alcoholic might be passed up for promotion because of a fear of
future behavior; a person currently taking anti-depressants might not be put
into what are perceived to be stressful situations.
These individuals would not need medical certification because,
theoretically, they would not be seeking accommodation in the workplace. Yet
the potential for discrimination is stfil there. In fact, allegations of prejudice on
the basis of "being treated as mentally impaired" has been a prevalent claim in
ADA (mental disability) litigation and probably possess the potential for
abuse.142
Perhaps the best way to address the situation is not an amendment that
would more specifically define "record of impairment" and "regarded as
impaired," but rather an amendment that would state what these terms do not
include. Within the sphere of mental disability litigation, courts have concurred
that "regarded as impaired" does not mean "a perceived, undiagnosed
disability." This language could be incorporated into the definitions for
disability. For example:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-...
(B) having a medical record for treatment of a mental or
physical disability, or
(C) currently receiving medical treatment for a mental or
physical disability
The term "disability" does not include a "perceived undiagnosed ailment."
In this way, there is still an acknowledgment that an individual being treated
for a mental disability might be discriminated against without the need for that
individual to provide medical documentation prior to an employment
incident. The amendment would, however, make clear that documentation of
the mental disability must exist in some sphere. This would theoretically
prevent employees from using the ADA to protect them from termination when
the only allegation is that they were "perceived" as disabled.
In addition, both the EEOC interpretive guidances and/or the Technical
Assistance Manual might also be modified to include provisions explaining
both the rights and obligations of employees. The manual might set forth some
uniform employment provisions detailing an employee's rights under the
ADA and explaining that the procedure for substantiating a future claim entails
a written diagnosis of a mental health professional submitted prior to a
disability and diseases are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment."
14 1See EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 100,120, 100,112 (1992).
142See George Will, Editorial: Disabilites Act may end up Granting Special Rights to Jerks,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 4,1996.
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complaint or lawsuit. Such model language would not be unprecedented. The
federal government has recently formulated model language for various,
federally regulated, pension disbursement agreements, 143 and most (if not all)
states have statutorily required language for many consumer contracts. 144 In
fact, the Technical Assistance Manual does contain suggested employee
handbook provisions, but these provisions tend only to include the information
that the employer is, in fact, bound by the criteria of the ADA.145 These
provisions should be enhanced to explain the statute, and it would not be out
of the question to suggest that some of these model provisions be statutorily
required.
While all employers might not feel comfortable giving their employees the
ammunition to be able to file a discrimination claim, such uniform provisions
would actually be beneficial to both employers and employees. Theoretically,
employers and employees would understand their obligations and outcomes
would not be subject to the changing tone of the court system. Costly litigation
could be avoided on both ends. An indirect positive result might be more
awareness of mental health, and the need to seek appropriate treatment prior
to losing employment or an opportunity for promotion.' 46
Additionally, the ADA should acknowledge that a mental disability may
require different standards and accommodations than a physical disability.
Whether the statute was intentionally vague or whether mental health is too
evolutionary to develop specific guidelines for protecting the
mentally-disabled, the statute inappropriately makes physical impairment
nearly synonymous with mental impairment. This has lead to incongruent
analogies as plaintiffs have attempted to engraft case law examining
discrimination against the physically disabled onto situations where there is
143See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 97-10: Sample Language for a Spouse's Waiver to a QJSA or a
QPSA; I.R.S. Notice 97-11: Sample Language for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
144 See, e.g., COLO. REv. ST. ANN. 6-1-203 (West 1997)(mandatory language to be
included in offer of collision damage waiver purchase); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 5715
(West 1997)(mandatory language for writ of possession); FLA. ST. ANN. § 627.7263 (West
1997)(mandatory notice that personal insurance covers rental vehicles); MINN. ST. ANN.
§ 325F.692 (West 1997)(mandatory notice to be included on phone bills); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 94.983 (West 1997) (mandatory notice of opportunity to cancel "membership camping
contract.") WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.105.390 (West 1997)(mandatory notice of
opportunity to cancel resort contract).
145 EEOC Tech. Assistance Manual par. 130,001 et seq. (1992).
146
"A recent Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study suggests that over 28% of
American adults have a diagnosable mental disorder in a given year. This same study
reveals that 14.7% of American adults-more that 23 million people-sought treatment
for mental or addictive disorders in one year." See Thompson, supra note 11, at 26 (citing
Darrell A Regier et al., The de Facto U.S. Mental and Addictive Disorders Service System:
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Prosepective 1-Year Prevalence Rates of Disorders and Services,
50 ARCH. OF GEN PSYCHIATRY 85, 88 (1993) and Evelyn 1. Bromet, et al., Epidemiology of
Depression and Alcohol Abuse/Dependence in a Mangerial and Professional Work Force, 32 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. 989, 992 tbl. 1 (1990)).
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an alleged mental disability.147 It is one thing to find obvious the need for a
wheelchair ramp, but another to expect an employer to recognize and
appropriately accommodate a psychiatric disorder. Some of the inappropriate
comparisons could be alleviated by revising the ADA to separate definitions
and analysis between physical impairments and mental impairments. While
there is arguably overlap in some cases, an overt acknowledgment that some
categories of mental disabilities are not at all appropriate for physical disability
analysis would aid in the development of clear expectations for both employers
and employees.
IX. CONCLUSION
The Americans with Disabilities Act has been an appropriate first step in
recognizing the possibility for discrimination against those with unseen mental
disabilities. However, because the statute and corresponding regulations do
not address mental disabilities with any amount of specificity, litigation under
the statute has resulted in a validation of nearly all employer firing decisions.
Additionally, this litigation has resulted in employees pursuing "novel"
theories of protection that were often predicated on perceptions rather than on
legitimate medical diagnoses. A revision of the statute and regulations that
acknowledges the difference between physical disability and mental disability
detailing acceptable methods for validating a disability claim would be
beneficial to both employers and employees. Both parties would be on notice
of rights and responsibilities. The end result would hopefully be courts
grappling less with defining those rights and responsibilities, and fairer
outcomes for those legitimately discriminated against.
147Such as the notion of discrimination based on the "perceived disability."
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